Introduction
In the race to be(come) globally competitive, knowledge-based economies, governments, firms and organisations around the world have all prioritised policies and programmes for the production, recruitment and retention of the future innovators, the 'talented', and 'highly skilled professionals'. "America's competitiveness", wrote Microsoft Corp Chairman, Bill Gates in a column in the Washington Post in 2007, is dependent on "…a single critical factor: innovation…our status as the world's center for new ideas cannot be taken for granted. Other governments are waking up to the vital role that innovation plays in competitiveness". Gates goes on to argue that two changes are needed if America wants to retain its position of economic dominance globally; the radical reform of schooling, and changes in the system of immigration as a result of events surrounding September 11 so that they might reflect the importance of highly skilled foreign born employees.
Gates is no lone ranger here. Across the Atlantic, the European Commission has launched a series of initiatives to achieve the goal of making Europe the most competitive knowledge-based society in the world. These initiatives include internally oriented policies to 'mobilise the brainpower of Europe' (European Commission, 2005) , to recruit the brightest talent from non-EU countries (European Commission, 2006) , and legislative initiatives to fast track access for foreign talent through the use of a 'scientific visa' residence permit for third country researchers (Euronews, 2005) .
Medium sized economies, such as Australia and Singapore, have also devised a range of innovative immigration, labour market and education strategies to attract high skilled labour in their efforts to stay in the global economic race. For Australia, this includes the creation of a 'distinguished talent visa' (for any applicant who can demonstrate an internationally recognised record of exceptional and outstanding achievement -[and who are financially independent]) (Australian Government Department for Immigration and Citizenship, 2007) , while Singapore's Global Schoolhouse project is intended to realise economic growth and value through becoming a global knowledge hub.
Not surprisingly, these 'knowledge', 'talent' and 'global competitiveness' initiatives have resuscitated a longer standing debate about brain drain, particularly when the brains being poached are predominantly from those parts of the world who can least afford their loss--low income countries. This is also a politically sensitive issue, given the focus of the development agenda since the 1990s; the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals aimed at reducing global poverty and enhancing economic growth, and the more recent prioritisation of knowledge by the multilateral agencies to drive the development process. Education, knowledge and skills are viewed as central in realising these agendas. However, when facts like 1 in 10 tertiary educated adults born in the developing world resided in America, Australia or Western Europe in 2001 (Lowell et al, 2004) , or that between 30 to 50 percent of the developing world's population of persons trained in science and technology live in the developed world (Lowell and Gerova, 2006: 6) , we can see the contradictions and tensions for the developed countries between strategies oriented to scouting for talent with a commitment to the development of lowincome countries.
The diaspora option emerges as a possible 'third way' solution to this problem. It is also one that multilateral agencies, like the World Bank, have found appealing, particularly when these diasporas are professional networks whose members are seen as having a foot in both camps; location and access to knowledge, skills and resources in the 'north' and a sense of duty to their origins in the 'south'. It is also an option being explored by national governments and firms, keen to draw upon the knowledge, skills and connections of their assumed patriotically-minded nationals. Far from these global workers developing more cosmopolitan attitudes, nationalism and duty are seen as strengthened. A few of these national initiatives feature in the Bank's repertoire of successes, for example GlobalChile (Chile), Red Caldas (Colombia), Redde Talentos (Mexico) and KEA-NZ (New Zealand). We might be encouraged, then, to read this 'third way' practice by the Bank as a win-win solution to a particularly intractable issue.
At first glance, the Bank's commitment to promoting skilled diasporas as mechanisms for development is very appealing. The World Bank, it would appear, is sensitive to the needs of developing countries and the loss of knowledge and skills. However, in this chapter I will be arguing that there is another way to read the World Bank's interests here. Grounded in a close analysis of the World Bank's Knowledge for Development Program initiative, Diasporas of Highly Skilled and Migration of Talent. I trace out how the Bank envisages the role of diasporas in development and diasporic talent. In this chapter I argue that the Bank privileges those diasporic networks that are the fractions of the transnational capitalist class. They have a good knowledge of the(ir once) 'local' scene, and are assumed to be well disposed agents to venture capital looking for new markets. These networks, then, act as the carriers of neo-liberal ideas, of productive and venture capital, and are the conduits for circulating the ideational and structural basis of a globally-integrated post-Fordist macro-economic order.
Brain Drain and the 'Diaspora Option'
While noting that brain drain is a difficult area to quantify as a result of the paucity of and poor quality data (Nunn, 2005) , we can see something of the magnitude of the problem in the following figures. Using the SESTAT database of the National Science Foundation (NSF), commentators Meyer and Brown (1999: 2) show that in 1995, 1,434 million (12%) out of the 12 million people who have science and engineering degrees, or who work in science and engineering occupations in the USA, are of foreign origin. Over 72% of these were originally born in a developing country. When looking at the level of the qualification, it appears that the higher the diploma, the bigger the foreign born population. 23% of those having a doctorate are not USA born citizens, and this proportion is even much higher in areas like engineering and computing. Viewed in these terms, the USA can been seen to rely very heavily on non-native skill holders. The same is also true of Japan and Europe, along with Australia, Canada and New Zealand, though it is difficult to give precise figures. The UNDP, for instance, have quantified the loss of IT professionals from India to the US at around $6b over three years (UNDP, 2001 ). The problem is particularly acute for African countries. On some estimates, there are more African scientists and engineers working in the USA than there are in Africa (ElKhawas, 2004) . And, with policies in place in the developed economies to prioritise the recruitment of talented and skilled labour across the globe, the problems facing developing countries are likely to intensify rather than diminish.
The statement of the problem takes several forms. For instance, is it right for the developed countries to poach the already limited skill pool available to developing countries? And, what about the monies that have been invested by governments in the education of individuals who then leave and do not return? This is usually countered by the argument that remittances circulate back, and contribute to the income of a country. The figures are significant. Hussain (2005) estimated that the total value of official remittance transfers flowing into developing countries is in the order to $US200 billion. However, more recently, agencies like the World Bank have begun to argue that low income countries need to manage migration, brain drain and the level of the skill base of the country to enable technology transfers in the form of FDI flows, minimise market failures, and secure integration into the world market (World Bank, 2003) .
The 'diaspora option' (Meyer and Brown, 2003 ) is a particularly novel solution to the problem outlined above. To begin with, it overcomes some of the conceptual problems that have dogged the idea of brain drain-as a one way and one dimensional flow of highly skilled people who move from their country of origin to another country, often in search of a better job and lifestyle. The idea of brain drain does not capture sufficiently well the less visible, backward and/or forward flows of communication, ideas, people and finances (in this latter case in the form of remittances). Conceptually, the 'diaspora option' also moves us beyond the narrow economism and human capital foci that had shaped brain drain debates. It does this by adding a social and political dimension (Rizvi, 2007: 231) ; it introduces location and memory-of places now and then-social relations here and there (Clifford, 1994) . This is reflected, too, in more recent approaches to migration studies, where the idea of transnationalism enables us to see globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified, ethnic groups (Vertovec, 1999: 449) , or self-identified ethnic groups who have formed social structures and institutions locally, and then globalised this model outward (Saxenian, 2006) . According to Saxenian, this contributes to a virtuous cycle-of drain and gain. Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006: 1) , in a paper written for the World Bank, have begun to argue that profound changes in the organisation of firms and value chains means we need to think differently about both migration and diaspora networks. Calling this approach 'New Industrial Policy', they argue that changes in the nature of work mean that skill acquisition is also changing. The argument goes something like this. Old forms of production were dependent upon specialised and dedicated machines and the acquisition of tacit knowledge (through apprenticeships). Workers with little or no knowledge could learn skills by progressing from machine to machine -in the process moving up the job ladder. In this world, migration and skill acquisition were distinct phenomena. Migrants who moved did so in order to get higher incomes rather than new skills. However, Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006: 3) , argue that flexible specialisation, together with the shift to networked forms of organisation, mean that dedicated machinery in firms will tend to be replaced by more general purpose reprogrammable machinery. This means that the capitalist must learn to shift from operation to operation, whilst the worker must commit themselves to a process of learning to learn (which finds expression in the concept of lifelong learning). "Potential migrants…," they argue, "…notice this shift," so that …migrants begin to look for destinations that offer many possibilities for skill acquisition at work or at school. …migration chains become open mobility networks-means for discovering where to go to learn how to learn to prosper in the reorganising economy. High skill diasporas are a conspicuous example of such networks (op. Cit.: 4).
Migration chains, such as the one that fed the development of the high technology sector in Silicon Valley in the United States, not only produce a skilled diaspora, but when organised into support groups, they can make it much easier for newer arrivals to settle and establish themselves. The Indus Entrepreneurs are identified by Kuznetsov and Sabel as a good example of a migration chain. Started in Silicon Valley in 1992, the Indus Entrepeneurs was created by the first generation of successful Indian entrepreneurs "…who wanted to make it easier for future generations of Indian emigrants to start businesses" (Saxenian, 2006: 57) . Members act as mentors, and are able to help others advance professionally, thus 'moving up' the migration chain. This is the 'know-who' knowledge that enables new opportunities to open up. According to Saxenian;
...the professional and technical associations organised by Silicon Valley's immigrant engineers in the 1980s and 1990s are now among the most vibrant and active professional associations in the region, with membership ranging from several hundred in the newer associations to more than a thousand in the established organisations" (p. 58).
More than this, these kinds of professional diasporic network can become the means through which social networks are extended to their home countries, kickstarting developments sufficiently for these entrepreneurs to return to invest significant time, knowledge and capital in their home country. In the case of the Indus Entrepreneurs, this meant investing back in Bangalore in India, and establishing a Silicon Valley like cluster there.
The final important step in Kuznetsov and Sabel's argument is their claim that "…as migrants progress along the value chain and acquire self-confidence which comes with personal and success, they start thinking about giving to and helping not just their families but the communities they came from" (2006: 5). Competitive homoeconomicus, it seems, morphs into altruistic homo-sociality, a point that I will return to at the conclusion. There is considerable interest, then, in this new way of thinking to arrest the problem of brain drain, but also how it might give us new insights into processes taking place in the globalising economy arising from changes in how goods and services are now produced. Seen in this light, Rizvi argues that; …the idea of professional diasporic networks suggests the possibility of creating infrastructures around which emigrants are able to actively participate in the development of their country of origin without having to physically live there. Such an approach accepts the emigration of skilled workers, broadly defined as those in possession of a tertiary degree or extensive specialised work experience, is inevitable, but insists and t the developing countries can nonetheless utilise their skills and knowledge. In this way, a 'professional diasporic network' emerges as an expression of a direct relationship between knowledge and development (Rizvi, 2007: 229) . Saxenian's (2006) and Kuznetsov and Sabel's (2006) claims raise important questions, especially in relation their causal assumptions about diasporas, of their connections to centres of development, and the reasons for some spectacular economic take-offs in specific instances of sending countries (see Storper, 2006 for a critique). However, for the moment I want to focus on how this particular issue is framed by the World Bank and how the Bank responds in policy and programme terms.
The World Bank's Diasporas of Highly Skilled and Migration of Talent Program
The World Bank's Diasporas of Highly Skilled and Migration of Talent Program is a major initiative inside its Knowledge for Development Program (K4D). This Program began in 1996 under the leadership of World Bank President, James Wolfensohn. Not only did the Bank reinvent itself as 'the Knowledge Bank ' (King, 2002) , but it placed knowledge at the centre of its development policies and programmes. The Bank's K4D argument was that the increased importance of knowledge provided great potential for developing countries to strengthen their economic and social development. The objective of the World Bank's K4D programme is to:
…stimulate social and economic development in client countries by building their capacity to access and use knowledge as a basis for enhancing competitiveness and increasing welfare. The K4D program is intended to help countries understand their strengths and weaknesses with respect to knowledge as a means to identifying appropriate policies for improvement of the country's performance and to give direction to the country's ambitions. Working closely with the World Bank's regional and sector teams, K4D works with client countries to create a framework for achievable action over a reasonable time period. To be effective, this work must be supported by the creation of the necessary capacity to deliver -namely, people and organizations with the skills, competencies and understanding capable of taking things forward, and supported by access (online and face-to-face) to networks of expertise and experience from across the world (World Bank 2007).
The Bank's Skilled Diaspora's initiative is structured around the identification of a series of 'national' diaspora initiatives the Bank believes are worthy of emulation. Mostly, these programs have been fostered by nationally-located governments to harness the knowledge of the diaspora for the purposes of their own national economic development. However, they also include skilled diaspora's that have formed organisations themselves, such as in the case of the Indus Entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley. The Bank, however, has chosen to promote a selected group of examples, though it also stresses the need to experiment with approaches rather than simply adopt and replicate 'best practice' (Kuznetsov, 2007a: 7) .
Nevertheless, Globalscot is presented by the Bank as a highly successful skilled diasporic network. This network, which began in 2000, consists of around 700 high placed Scots from all over the world. As part of the Scottish Economic Development Agency, the Globalscot network "…harnesses the talents, expertise and commitment of the many Scots and friends of Scotland who are active in the international community around the world" (see http://www.globalscot.com). Examples of early success stories give us a clue as to what kind of knowledge and skills are being circulated and valued by the Bank.
…a Globalscot member who does VP Production Procurement at IBM donated one day a month to working with a Scottish Enterprise electronic's team, providing insight into the global electronics sector by advising on new product developments, growing and shrinking markets, and new opportunities; an inward investment project was identified through one of the members to respond to the invitation to participate in the Globalscot. It has now brought an internet licensing company to Glasgow… . (Kuznetsov, 2007a: 10) .
In an analysis of Chile, the Bank notes that "…while there are many good firms (first movers'), many promising/successful initiatives, highly skilled professionals abroad; yet critical mass of rapid sustained growth is slow to emerge" (Kuznetsov, 2005a: 4) . What is thus needed is a new generation of technology alliances. ChileGlobal is promoted as the kind of initiative that can generate the kinds of changes that will make Chile like a 'new Asian tiger' (Kuznetsov, 2007a: 12) .
Based on the Globalscot model, ChileGlobal is housed in Foundation Chile, "…a premier and highly idiosyncratic business innovation organisation, which designs and finances business innovation projects" (Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2006: 7-8) . It is a network of around 60 or so Chileans in the USA, Canada and Europe 1 . By leveraging talent abroad, the Bank argues that Chile will be able to use this pool of talent as "an entry point into a knowledge-based economy" (Kuznetsov, 2005a: 3) . An example of the successful use of GlobalChile is offered by Yevgeny Kuznetsov (op. Cit), the Bank's Senior Programme Officer who directs the Skilled Diaporas programme.
In 1997 Ramon L. Garcia, a Chilean biotechnology entrepreneur, CEO of InterLink, contracted Fundacion Chile; Interlink developed a way to identify novel chemical entities derived from micro-organisms. After jointly reviewing their portfolios of initiatives, InterLink and Fundacion founded a new, coowned company, Biogenetic S.A. The company is key to the continuing competitiveness of its rapidly growing agribusiness sector. Without Garcia's deep knowledge of Chile, advanced U.S. education, exposure to U.S. managerial practice, and experience as an entrepreneur, the new company would have been inconceivable.
Despite the Banks' view that developing and utilising skilled diaspora should be the subject of experimentation and learning, suggesting that the process is more open, fluid and contingent, closer inspection of the Bank's assumptions about skilled diaspora reveals a very particular ontology at work.
Imagining Development and the Skilled Diaspora
So, what are the fundamental assumptions made by the Bank in this programme? With regard to development, the Bank asserts that the "…market for the highly skilled will become more globally integrated, that increasing returns to skills will continue to favour spatial concentration (clustering phenomenon), that brain drain will increase, both from developed and developing countries…" and there will be an "…expansion of far-flung diasporas -networks of expatriats abroad" (Kuznetsov, 2005b) . In other words, the Bank's assumptions are premised on the expansion of global capitalism and neo-liberal ideologies to guide this expansion. This includes freer movements of labour, capital and goods and services.
These processes of spatial agglomeration and dispersal have also been driven by the premium being placed on talent and skills by firms and governments to generate innovation and value, by the ideas of intellectuals like Charles Sabel 2 on flexible specialisation, and by Porter's (1998) idea of clusters as contributing to higher levels of innovation through minimising transaction costs. In the shift away from mass production to flexible specialisation, new industrial spaces have emerged that are the result of changing organisational structures and input/output relations (vertical disintegration) (MacKinnon et al, 2002: 295) . One consequence is that skilled labour will tend to cluster in particular locations, as with Silicon Valley and IT engineers.
There is also increasingly concern with the social and institutional foundations of growth, and this is reflected the interest in the extra-economic relations as sources of competitive advantage in a globalising, knowledge-driven economy of the 1990s (Jessop, 2000) . The interest in the knowledge of the skilled professional diaspora, and specifically strategically embodied and embedded global and local knowledges for the purposes of the development of a global economy, can be viewed as a form of 'cognitive capitalism' (Vercellone, 2007) . Vercellone argues that this new phase in the division of labour is being shaped by the driving role of the production of knowledges by means of knowledge connected to the increasingly immaterial and cognitive character of labour (2007: 16). 'Skilled diasporas' (as opposed to unskilled diasporas -which the Bank has no interest in but are numerically the most important), and their presumed knowledge of the 'global' and the 'local', together with their presumed commitment to their 'homelands' (patriotism), are a good example of how the extra-economic is mobilised in the interests of economic development and global competitiveness. These 'skilled diasporas', in particular those who are "…the entrepreneurs and managers of technology start-ups" (Kuznetsov, 2005b) , are viewed by the Bank as those networks which can "…function as bridge, translator and midwife for the development of knowledge-based economies" (Kuznetsov, 2006: 225) .
Imagining the Diasporic Entrepreneur
The Bank views the skilled migrant as an active member of an expatriate community who has three qualities: …high motivation and to have a significant influence on the course of events in spite of and against all odds; knowledge and expertise of both global opportunities and local particulars; and frequently, financial resources to act on new opportunities. When these resources combine, usually as a matter of pure luck, the contributions of diasporas can be spectacular, as the experiences of China and India indicate.
These entrepreneurial qualities-motivation, global and local knowledges, and financial resources-are viewed as placing the 'expatriate professional' in a unique position to make a contribution to their home countries and the creation of a knowledge-based economy (Kuznetsov, 2006: 221) . The Bank's also characterizes these diasporic entrepreneurs as having 'talent' (defined as having a high impact in sciences and technology, business, culture and politics); they are 'creative' and hence innovators; they are 'risk takers' (assumed because leaving their home country is seen as a 'leap of faith'); and they have high levels of intrinsic motivation (the ability to achieve results despite many obstacles and against all of the odds). Such talents and levels of motivation are seen as 'inherent' in expatriates and the basis of innovation (op.Cit.: 222), and innovation is viewed as at the "…the root of successful development".
The Bank argues that expatriates' engagements with their home country moves through a series of evolutionary stages, and that "skipping stages" is difficult (op.Cit.: 224). Within this framing, the expatriate is only weakly committed to the diaspora and their home country; indeed, the diaspora may be seen as a potential impediment to them getting ahead. However, weak commitments are magically translated into strong ones as the migrant moves up the labour market ladder. Thus …as migrants advance from lower paid and lower skilled jobs, they acquire the confidence needed to think about contributing to the communities of their home countries. Thin search networks for simple job searches evolve into thick search networks for professional advancement, mentoring and learning, and then into diaspora networks (op.Cit.: 222).
These diasporic entrepreneurs will belong to different kinds of diasporic networks which are outlined by the Bank as:
1. Top executives model -India and Scotland -Indian executives in multinational firms influenced decisions to outsource knowledge-intensive operations in India. 2. Mentoring/Venture capital model -South Africa, Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Scotland -Managers and owners of European start-up firms of South African origin work South African start-up to develop and finance commercially viable projects. 3. Diaspora members as investors -Greater China (Bamboo network) -Diapora members know the reality of their home country well and have access to risk mitigation strategies. Personal trust between members of cross border investor networks reduces transaction costs. 4. Setting up new strategic direction/identification of new opportunities -Israel, Armenia, India -diaspora members identify niches: translate global opportunities into business projects (as scanning networks) 5. Return of talent model -China, Korea -incentives (like technology parks in China) for the talent to come back. 6. Outsourcing model -Armenia -successful diaspora members who 'made it' send back outsourcing contracts to firms back home (Kuznetsov, 2005b: 10) .
We have a sense here of the kind of skills these diaspora's are imagined to embrace and embody. Taken together, the ontology of the skilled diasporic professional is a profoundly Western, Enlightenment, neo-liberal subject, while the diasporic entrepreneurs are the venture capitalist, the executives of multinational firms, and the global economic strategists. They are, as Saxenian terms, the new Argonauts -the global economic adventurers and pioneer investors of the 21 st Century, whose knowledge and skills can be put to work for development. Their talent for getting on, for having the right contacts, and for making money from a good idea can thus "…serve as an entry point into new markets" (op. Cit.: 224), in this case in developing countries. In being cultural brokers, they also reduce the transaction costs associated with doing business in unfamiliar territories. Brain drain has now been turned into brain circulation and gain, disguising not only what is being circulated and its implications for development, but the class interests of the diaspora network itself.
What is Being Circulated?
There are three questions that I want to address in this final section. First, what kinds of assumptions are made about diasporas by the Bank, which of those diasporas are privileged, and which are silenced? Second, how might we understand the role of the World Bank in this process, and what are the Bank's interests in using skilled professional diaspora for the purposes of development? Third, what does the mobilisation of ideas and sentiments, like 'national' and 'patriotism' conceal? Regarding the first question, the Bank sees those skilled diasporas who can contribute to national development as entrepreneurs. Framed in such a way that they sit outside of the market and the state, these diasporic entrepreneurs are assumed to have reached a stage of their life when their economic interests have now been replaced by more altruistic sentiments and interests; the good of the nation. They are also seen as able to broker deals because of their cultural know-how. However, as Rizvi (2007: 236) points out, the immigrant's return may well be met with hostility and resentment. By privileging this model of diasporic entrepreneur in its discourse and programme, the Bank not only silences those diasporas who may be critical of political and economic developments in their homelands, but it is complicit in thickening transnational flows that continue to be based on those inequalities arising out of unequal capitalist ownership and production (Rizvi, 2007: 236) .
In terms of the second question, the role of the World Bank in this process, it is important to situate the World Bank's Skilled Diaspora initiative the Bank's wider Knowledge for Development Program, on the one hand, and on the World Bank's wider agenda and role on the other. Paul Cammack (2003: 38) argues that the World Bank's apparently progressive initiatives, such as the poverty reduction strategies, the focus on knowledge for development, and so on, should be seen as an explicit project; … aimed at the completion of the world market and the global imposition of the social relations and disciplines central to capitalist reproduction. This is pursued through the promotion of a 'sound' macro-economic framework, along with structural reforms-national and global liberalisation, and privatisation -and associated regulatory innovations.
Elsewhere I have shown, through an analysis of the Bank's Knowledge Assessment Methodology (the centre piece of the Bank's K4D program), that the Bank's activities should be seen as a political project; to 'produce' the ideational and structural basis of a globally-integrated post-Fordist macro-economic order of western-centred capitalism (see Robertson, 2007) . This initiative, far from being a benign tool for leveraging the knowledge and skills of nationals abroad for national development, are the networks or conduits for circulating the ideational and embedding the structural basis of this new post Fordist global order. The kinds of diasporic networks selected and promoted by the Bank, the entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, global executives and strategists who can use their knowledge of the 'global' and the 'local' to negotiate entry to new markets, gives us a sense of the kinds of knowledge and skill that the Bank envisages should being circulated in the name of development and the kinds of actions and transactions that would constitute 'effective' development.
The circulation and embedding of ideas, however, should not be viewed as a one way or inevitable process. The advance of a particular imaginary and its circulation through diasporic networks will be highly uneven and a contingent process. Dezalay and Garth (2002) , for instance, in their study of the export of 'good governance' and the rule of law to a range of Latin American countries, show how international strategies are embedded in national fields of power, and that strategies are transformed in both directions in the process -the global and the local. They also show how similar northern strategies behave differently according to the position of the importers in the south. This goes some way to explaining the success of the Bank's 'model' diasporic network initiative in Chile as opposed to its perceived failure in Argentina. For the moment, however, the World Bank views these internal conditions as 'poor governance' and state failure (see Kuznetsov, 2006) , rather than Argentina's resistance to the import of neoliberalism by the Bank and other actors.
In terms of the third issue, of the Bank's mobilisation of notions like 'patriotism' and the assumed evolution of altruism of the diasporic entrepreneur, this language conceals the interests and class location of these global entrepreneurs -as the transnational capitalist class (TCC). Sklair (2005: 59) argues that the TCC is transnational in a double sense. That is, that it members have globalising rather than, or in addition to, localising perspectives, and that it typically contains people from many countries who operate transnationally as a normal part of their working lives. Sklair identifies 4 fractions; (i) those who own and control major transnational corporations (corporate fraction), (ii) globalising state and interstate bureaucrats and politicians (state fraction), (iii) globalising professionals (technical fraction), and (iv) merchants and media (consumerist fraction). The Bank's skilled diasporas programme potentially involve all three of these fractions-the corporate, state and professional-who increasingly serve the interests of globalising rather than localising capital. And, while they are mobilised to operate on local spaces, it is their global knowledge and connections to the centres of political and economic power that are valued and imported.
Conclusions
Several elements come together in the Bank's skilled professional diasporas initiative that make this an important site for the analysis of the relationship between power and culture, and the ways in which they constitute the social worlds we live in the social realities we see. These elements; leveraging the de-territorialised skills of the diasporic networks; the use of national sentimentality and patriotism-not for war but for some higher cause; and the closer linkage between current centres of political and economic power and the peripheries through diasporic networks, all for the development of lowincome countries, make this a particularly appealing initiative. What is occluded in this first reading are the locations and interests of the Bank's preferred diasporic networks and entrepreneurs and the knowledges that the bank believe should be circulated via these networks; the globalising of western centred capitalism via fractions of the transnational capitalist class. And, while not explicitly referred to in the Bank's initiative, we also see the mobilisation of social capital (diasporic networks) to advance the interests of capital much as we had seen the Bank deploy this idea to replace the state. Here, too, we see transnationally-located social capital and their venture capital kick-start the closer integration of the developing economies into the global economy. Securing sufficient levels of development in low income countries is necessary to ensure technology transfers (in return for exchange value), while opening up migration chains enables talent to be freely mobile to where and when capital most requires it. However, capitalism both profits from, and produces uneven development; it demands and must overcome the problems of fixity and territory; the knowledges it increasingly privileges in the game of cognitive capitalism can also be deployed for emancipatory purposes. These kinds of contradictions are likely to surround the Skilled Diaspora's Initiative, just as they are built into the wider Knowledge for Development programme. These very contradictions will become increasingly problematic in the World Bank's political project-of extending western-centred capitalism, in turn requiring new cultural projects and alternative strategies of power.
